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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been
called “the paradigmatic New Deal agency,”1 created in 1934
with broad authority to regulate a general area of the economy
and “largely staffed with reformers eager to expose and correct
the misdeeds of corporate institutions and executives.”2 Its
charge was to regulate the common-carrier telegraph,
© 2017 Brent Skorup & Joseph Kane
* Technology Policy Program research fellow at the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University.
† Graduate research fellow (M.A., Economics) at the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University.
1. Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A
Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications
Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 40 (2015).
2. JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 196 (1976).
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telephone operators, and the nascent broadcast radio industry
as public utilities.3 To that end, Congress created the FCC to
“make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges.”4
This broad grant of jurisdiction allowed agency goals to
shift markedly and expansively into adjacent markets. Major
regulatory interventions into mass media, such as broadcast
media ownership rules,5 investigation into newspaperbroadcast cross-ownership,6 the Fairness Doctrine,7 and cable
TV regulation,8 were not expressly authorized in the 1934 Act.
These self-initiated expansions in authority were sometimes
3. Senator Dill, author of the bill that created the Federal Radio
Commission, told colleagues, “[i]n this proposed law, however, we have laid
down a basic principle—namely, the principle of the public interest,
convenience, and necessity—which is the general legal phrase used regarding
all public utilities engaged in interstate commerce.” 68 CONG. REC. 3006, 3027
(1927). This public utility language was retained in the 1934 Communications
Act when the FCC was created and its authority extended to telegraph and
telephone. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152 (“[R]apid growth
of communications technology requires unified system of regulation, and
sufficient flexibility and breadth of mandate to permit Commission, confronted
with new technology nor governed by statute but having serious impact on
technology that is, to adopt such regulations as will enable it to
protect public interest.”).
4. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
5. See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941); Comment, The
Impact of the FCC’s Chain Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78, 78 n.3 (1951)
(“The Communications Act does not specifically authorize the FCC to regulate
competition in the radio industry and the legislative history is at best
equivocal.”).
6. Orders No. 79 and 79-A, No. 60651, 8 F.C.C. 589, 589–591 (1941); Law
Review Editors, Comment, Old Standards in New Context: A Comparative
Analysis of FCC Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 78, 78 n.3 (1950) (citing Nat’l
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), as the seminal case).
7. Report on Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, No. 8516, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (1949). These “fairness” requirements were ratified by Congress in 1959.
See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012).
8. The Communications Act never contemplated cable TV, and the FCC
repeatedly failed to receive authority to regulate cable and its predecessor,
community antenna TV (CATV). Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1194 (1973). With a change in
administration, the FCC decided it did have the authority, and the Supreme
Court upheld its claim. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968). This authority was codified by Congress about twenty years later.
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
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ratified by courts or Congress later, but Congress’s major
amendments to the Communications Act since the 1970s9 have
deregulated cable TV10 and telecommunications.11 However,
unlike two other industry-specific common-carrier regulators,
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the FCC survived the national mood for laissezfaire regulation.12 Even modest grants of regulatory authority
resulted in substantial increases in new staff and
appropriations,13 and today the FCC still exercises considerable
authority over mass-media and telecommunications firms14
including Comcast-NBCU, Google, AT&T-DirecTV, DisneyABC, Sirius-XM, and T-Mobile.15

9. See JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: THE
UNLEASHING OF AMERICA’S COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 11 (1986) (“[B]ut
communications deregulation predates Reagan’s inauguration in January
1981 by several years. Moreover, it was the Democratic administration of
President Carter which, in the late 1970s, gave communications deregulation
its major political momentum.”).
10. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 2779 (repealing
many FCC cable TV regulations). However, the 1992 amendments to the Act
did expand the FCC’s regulatory authority over cable. Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (Oct. 5, 1992).
11. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(Feb. 8, 1996). However, many believed this law was inadequate for the task.
Only a few months after President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 into law, his former advisor John Podesta wrote that “technology, and
especially the Internet, is about to sweep past this legislation and make it
obsolete. Once again, Congress has legislated with all eyes firmly fixed on the
rear view mirror.” John D. Podesta, Unplanned Obsolescence: The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093,
1109 (1996).
12. Joe Kane, The FCC: How an Obsolete Agency Survives, PLAINTEXT
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://readplaintext.com/the-fcc-how-an-obsolete-agencysurvives-8b3891982dd9 (“Since the 1970s, much economic regulation of
established technologies has come to be seen to be obsolete. Both the ICC and
CAB were abolished, but the FCC survives.”).
13. After the 1992 Act took effect, the FCC’s budget increased by $80
million—nearly forty percent—and the agency hired new staff for price
regulation of the cable industry. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN
CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM
122 (1997).
14. The FCC’s common-carrier laws are found in Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–76 (2012). The FCC’s TV laws
are found in Title VI. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–73 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Merger Review by the Federal
Communications Commission: Comcast-NBC Universal, U. PENN. L. SCH.
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The FCC’s recent assertions of authority to oversee
internet services, apps, and online user privacy mark a longanticipated reality: the great projects of the twentieth-century
FCC are over.16 We document the breakdown of the public
utility model for mass media and telecommunications. The
telegraph has disappeared, as has the AT&T long-distance
monopoly. Facilities-based, local phone competition, thought
impossible even as recently as the 1990s, is present.17 Gone
are the days of three broadcast TV networks and a few local
stations, and mass media consumer choice has never been
more abundant.18 Today hundreds of TV channels and
ubiquitous internet access provide access to every viewing
niche imaginable.19
In theory, these accomplishments might warrant the
elimination or reduction of a New Deal agency’s regulatory
authority.20 An agency should shrink once its goals have been
achieved, whether by market forces or by regulatory
intervention,21 and members of Congress have proposed
(2014),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2544&
context=faculty_scholarship.
16. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, The Death and Life of a Great American
Agency, 31 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 160, 160 (2014) (“As
communications and media platforms converge into a digital broadband
amalgam, the case for a sector-specific regulator suddenly appears
uncertain.”).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See, e.g., Adam Thierer & Grant Eskelsen, Media Metrics: The True
State of the Modern Media Marketplace, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. 16–19
(Summer 2008), http://www.pff.org/mediametrics/Media%20Metrics%20%
5BVersion%201.0%5D.pdf.
19. FCC, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2013,
at 10 (Oct. 2014), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business
/2014/db1016/DOC-329973A1.pdf (finding that ninety-three percent of
households in census tracts where internet service providers reported
connections had three or more providers offering at least 10 Mbps).
20. NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE
WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 (1995)
(“A television system with hundreds or thousands of channels—especially
channels that people pay to watch—not only destroys the notion of channel
scarcity upon which the public-trustee theory rests but simultaneously
breathes life and logic into the libertarian model.”); Werbach, supra note 16, at
161 (“In this environment, the foundations for the FCC’s legal authority are
unsteady.”); see HUBER, supra note 13, at 16 (proposing the elimination of the
FCC and a return to common law).
21. Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909,
910 (1994).
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dismantling the FCC since the late 1970s.22 What accounts for
the FCC’s persistence, even as its original purposes—
overseeing a national telephone monopoly and promoting a
nascent broadcast radio industry—are obsolete?
We posit, after reviewing trends in communications law,
that the FCC is not going anywhere soon. In this article we
identify why, despite competition, falling prices, and expanding
output in telecommunications and media, the agency will
survive indefinitely and may expand its jurisdiction. We
address a prominent theory after the passage of the
deregulatory 1996 Telecommunications Act that the FCC would
survive simply as a modest economic regulator of
“bottlenecks.”23 While it is still too early to dismiss this theory
completely, it failed to foresee some important changes in the
FCC’s regulatory philosophy and strategy. Namely, the FCC
and its defenders in recent years have largely shifted the FCC
from an economic regulator to a social regulator—a shift
consistent with public choice theory.24 We also highlight a
resilient (and incoherent) theory of law—quasi-common
carriage—that coincided with this shift and will keep the
agency and its constituencies quite active going forward.25 This
22. Representative Lionel Van Deerlin, the liberal Democratic chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Communications and former broadcast TV
anchorman, drafted a bill to eliminate the FCC. See Carole Shifrin, FCC
Members Oppose Executive Branch Unit, WASH. POST (July 19, 1978),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1978/07/19/fcc-membersoppose-executive-branch-unit/ba8fc3f0-f3b3-49d1-a5c2-3bc227e91b63. The bill
would have replaced the FCC with a modest Communications Regulatory
Commission. Communications Act of 1978, H.R. 13015, 95th Cong. (1978).
23. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1998) (“The role
of the agency has been transformed from one of protecting end-users to one of
arbitrating disputes among rival providers and, in particular, overseeing
access to and pricing of ‘bottleneck’ facilities that could be exploited by
incumbent firms to stifle competition.”).
24. See MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE
PUBLIC (2d ed. 1981); Bruce Yandle & Elizabeth Young, Regulating the
Function, Not the Industry, 51 PUB. CHOICE 59 (1986).
25. As we discuss infra Section III.A, quasi-common carriage has existed
for decades at the FCC, but Professor Rob Frieden seems to be the first scholar
to have highlighted the phenomenon. See Rob Frieden, The Rise of QuasiCommon Carriers and Conduit Convergence, 9 I/S J.L. & POL’Y 471, 472 (2014)
(explaining how the FCC has been able to impose what the author considers
“quasi-common carrier” responsibilities, such as mandatory carriage of local
broadcast TV signals, on ventures that do not appear to qualify for FCC
regulation).
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change in regulatory philosophy, which evolved over decades
but became prominent in recent years as common carriage
withered in the face of deregulatory pressures,26 will likely
ensure agency survival for the foreseeable future.
II. BACKGROUND: THE END OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY
MODEL IN TELEPHONE AND BROADCAST
The agency’s dominant standard is to regulate wired and
wireless distributors according to “public interest, convenience,
or necessity.”27 This is a classic phrase used in public utility
statutes but has a unique interpretation under the
Communications Act.28 In this Part, we highlight the
breakdown of industrial policy and the gradual shift to social
objectives
in
telecommunications
and
media.
For
telecommunications, the Communications Act was designed to
allow the FCC to regulate the AT&T long-distance monopoly
and promote a single, compatible telephone network.29 For
broadcast, the sustaining theory for public utility regulation
was the scarcity of airwaves, which required technocratic
allocation to prevent damaging interference.30 Technological
change undermined theories that telephony was a natural

26. See Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of
Common Carriage, 18 TELECOMM. POL’Y 435, 435 (1994).
27. Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 295 (1930)
(discussing the use of the “public interest, convenience, or necessity” standard
in many communication regulation statutes).
28. As the first general counsel of the Federal Radio Commission, Louis
Caldwell, said, “[o]nly an indefinite and very elastic standard should be
prescribed for the regulation of an art and a field of human endeavor which is
progressing and changing at so rapid a pace as is radio communication.” Id. at
296. Caldwell noted that broadcasting was a non-common-carrier public
utility. Id. at 328. He reproduced a Federal Radio Commission majority
statement that broadcast is in “a different group of public utilities, i.e., those
engaged in purveying commodities to the general public, such, for example, as
heat, water, light and power companies, whose duties are to consumers, just
as the duties of broadcasting stations are to listeners.” Id. at 327–28 n.62
(italics in original).
29. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 21 (2d ed. 1999).
30. See FCC, JOHN W. BERRESFORD, THE SCARCITY RATIONALE FOR
REGULATING TRADITIONAL BROADCASTING: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS
PASSED, MEDIA BUREAU STAFF RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2005-2 (Mar. 2005),
https://transition.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-released/scarcity030005
.pdf.
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monopoly and that broadcast media was uniquely scarce.31
Increasingly, therefore, the FCC relied on social—not
economic—aims to preserve the public utility status of
telecommunications and mass media firms.32
A. THE END OF NATURAL MONOPOLY IN TELEPHONE
In 1934 it was accepted that local and long-distance
telephone
service
were
natural
monopolies.33
The
Communications Act therefore vested the FCC with oversight
of interstate telecommunications service—the AT&T longdistance telephone monopoly.34 However, by the 1960s and
1970s,
the
natural-monopoly
justification
for
telecommunications regulation came under stress as
competitors like MCI entered the long-distance market.35 With
the natural monopoly theory undermined, the FCC made
universal telephone service a major pillar of agency action.36
An extraordinarily complex system of cross subsidies
developed,37 in which the FCC administered and subsidized
local phone service with long-distance rates.38

31. Id.
32. Caldwell, supra note 27.
33. S. REP. NO. 781-73, at 2–3 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 1850-73, at 2–3
(1934); 78 CONG. REC. 4139, 8822–24, 8853, 10312–17, 10322–23 (1934); see
also Hearings before Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce on Commission on
Communications, 71st Cong. 1085-88, 1250, 1582-85, 2115-31, 2137 (19291930); Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 11364, 11366 & n.9 (1999) (citing 78 CONG. REC. 10314
(1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn)) (“Congress enacted the section 214(a) entry
certification requirements to prevent useless duplication of facilities . . . .”).
34. The agency’s charge was to ensure just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory rates and practices toward other, mostly local,
telecommunications providers. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). Regulation of local
phone service rates and practices were largely devolved to the states and
enforced by state public utility commissions. Id.
35. See Robert W. Crandall, Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S.
Model, 8 NBER-EASE 415, 415 (Jan. 2000), http://www.nber.org/chapters
/c8489.pdf (describing the entry of MCI into the long-distance communications
market).
36. MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION,
INTERCONNECTION AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
TELEPHONE SYSTEM 155 (1997).
37. The existing universal-service mechanisms created “a system of such
aggregate bewildering complexity that it [was] intelligible only to specialized
accountants—at best. Society at large, including its policy makers, [had] long
lost the ability to . . . judge the . . . system by some criteria of fairness or
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The shift that occurred in telephone regulation since the
1960s suggests a recurring pattern: 1. the FCC’s original
industrial policy is superseded, and 2. new social goals replace
prior economic regulation. Occasionally Congress or the courts
will ratify this expansion in FCC authority, sometimes decades
later. As Professor Milton Mueller has documented, this
universal-service role for the FCC was largely manufactured as a
post hoc justification for the Bell monopoly as competitors like
MCI began encroaching on AT&T’s long-distance business.39
Residential phone penetration at the time already exceeded
ninety percent.40 Nevertheless, the FCC’s policy shift away from
oversight and maintenance of phone monopolies and toward
universal service was ratified by Congress in the 1996
Telecommunications Act and persists today.41 The four
universal-service programs have distributed tens of billions of
dollars since the passage of the Telecommunications Act but
have a record of dubious efficacy42—economists estimate the cost
of adding a marginal telephone subscriber in this era exceeded
$100,000.43 (As we’ll see, this pivot toward dubious social goals
using largely ineffective mechanisms serves an adaptive function
for the agency.)
Longstanding theories of natural monopoly in local
telephony, so-called last-mile bottlenecks, are also undone.

efficiency.” Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization III: Reforming Universal
Service, 18 TELECOMM. POL’Y 687, 691 (1994).
38. This is the so-called Ozark Plan. See Jerry Hausman & Howard
Shelanski, Economic Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate
Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 23 (1999).
39. Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A
Reconstruction, 17 TELECOMM. POL’Y 352, 355 (1993) (“Thus the modern
notion of universal service . . . is a very recent construction. It is not a
longstanding historical policy with its roots in the Communications Act.”).
40. FCC, UNIVERSAL SERVICE MONITORING REPORT 48 tbl.6.4 (2014).
Telephone penetration has hovered around ninety-five percent for the last twenty
years. FCC, UNIVERSAL SERVICE MONITORING REPORT 46 (2015).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, The Remedy for the “Bottleneck
Monopoly” in Telecom: Isolate It, Share It, or Ignore It?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9
(2005); Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 38, at 21 (finding that the Schools
and Library program “is unusually costly” and funded in a way that “conflicts
with established principles of public finance and welfare economics”).
43. Thomas W. Hazlett & Scott J. Wallsten, Unrepentent Policy Failure:
Universal Service Subsidies in Voice & Broadband, ARLINGTON ECON. 53
(June 2013) (estimating that “the cost per extra (voice) connected household
exceeds $100,000”).
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After the 1984 breakup of AT&T, federal policy reversed and
began encouraging competition in local telephone markets,
another reversal codified in the 1996 Telecommunications
Act.44 Congress, however, only partially repudiated the
natural-monopoly status of phone companies and therefore had
infrastructure-sharing mandates for the incumbent phone
operators.45 These mandates failed at producing effective
competition,46 but competition nevertheless arrived. The local
phone companies saw their hold on subscribers broken by
providers that Congress scarcely contemplated when writing
the 1996 Telecommunications Act: cable TV and cellular
providers.
Consumers have fled the legacy phone providers—
incumbent local exchange carriers, who have suffered losses of
about 100 million subscribers since 200047—for the wireless
and cable upstarts.48 In 2003 only about 3% of households were
wireless only,49 but by 2015 about 47% of households were
wireless only.50 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service from
cable operators has also made huge inroads. The FCC’s most
recent report on telephone competition showed that more
residential customers had VoIP service, typically from cable

44. See Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1191 (2000).
45. See Robert W. Crandall & Leonard Waverman, The Failure of
Competitive Entry into Fixed-Line Telecommunications: Who Is at Fault?, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 113 (2006), for a discussion of the practical and legal
deficiencies of the FCC’s network unbundling and interconnection rules.
46. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks with
and Without Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 482 (2006).
47. Compare WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2008, at 5 tbl.2 (July 2009) (reporting
that incumbent local exchange carriers had over 140 million residential
customers in 2000), with WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, VOICE TELEPHONE
SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2015, at 3 fig.2 (Aug. 2016) (reporting that
ILECs had under 40 million residential customers in 2015).
48. Hazlett, supra note 46, at 489, 499–500. Cable systems offering phone
service utilize Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and interconnect with
traditional telephone providers. Id. at 489–91.
49. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET
CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 71 (2005).
50. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET
CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 99 chart
VII.D.1 (2015).
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companies, than traditional switched telephone service.51 The
results have been significant downward pressure on price,
multiple competitors in every market, and the attainment of
facilities-based phone competition.52 In short, the natural
monopoly justifications for public utility regulation of local (and
long-distance) markets have evaporated.53 Yet once again the
FCC discovered novel social goals in the Communications Act.
Local exchange carriers and their new cable competitors now
find themselves subject to internet content nondiscrimination
rules—net neutrality—which focuses on social, not economic or
competitive considerations.54 Net neutrality is discussed more
fully below.
B. THE END OF SCARCITY IN MASS MEDIA
The FCC is the primary regulator of mass media
distributors. The public-trustee model in broadcast, justified by
spectrum scarcity,55 has long been proffered as a defense
against the “libertarian model,” which resists government
attempts to shape media content, business models, and

51. WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION:
STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2015, at 3 fig.2 (Aug. 2016).
52. Hazlett, supra note 46, at 489, 505–06.
53. As Howard Shelanski concluded in 2007, “[t]he combination of interand intramodal competition have greatly diminished the prospects for any
exercise of market power by [local phone companies],” and “[t]he long-distance
telephone market has all but disappeared as a viable line of business.” Howard
A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for
US Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 75–76 (2007).
54. Tim Wu, who coined “net neutrality,” noted that the FCC, not
competition agencies, needs to regulate content nondiscrimination because
“the FCC is equipped to deal with issues like regionalism, like localism, like
diversity” and “political bias.” Net Neutrality: Is Antitrust Law More Effective
Than Regulation in Protecting Consumers and Innovation? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 84, 94 (June 20, 2014) (comments of
Professor Tim Wu, Columbia Law School). Net neutrality advocates say that
competition does not negate the need for regulation. Werbach, supra note 16,
at 163 (noting that “even in competitive markets,” companies “may act as de
facto monopolists” and need regulation); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 150
(2005) (noting that competition among ISPs does not ensure passive carriage
of internet content).
55. See HENRY GELLER, RAND CORP., THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN
BROADCASTING: PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION (Dec. 1973),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R1412.pdf.
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distributor architecture.56 Despite a virtual explosion in media
distributors and output, the FCC maintains its authority to
regulate media outlets as public trustees.
The FCC derived its responsibility to control media
composition and content57 from a statutory duty to assign
broadcast licenses if such assignment was in the public
interest.58 For most of FCC history, lasting until the 1990s
when subscription cable TV dominated, broadcast licensure
and content oversight were perhaps the highest priorities for
top FCC officials.59 Though explicitly limited to authority over
broadcast and telecommunications, the agency asserted
“ancillary authority” since the 1960s to regulate other media
distributors like cable TV.60 The scarcity rationale, then, while
seemingly limited to broadcast, is also the source of FCC
authority over non-broadcast media distributors.

56. Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise of Private Property Rights in the
Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DUKE L.J. 611, 627 (1996).
57. Broadcast licensees have censored political and titillating speech that,
if aired, might endanger their lucrative licenses. Seymour N. Siegel,
Censorship in Radio, 7 AIR L. REV. 1, 4 (1936) (“There have been verified
instances where smaller stations, in the hope of gaining the good graces of the
new party in power, refused facilities to the critics of the New Deal.”).
58. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 309(a) (2012). It was conventional wisdom for
decades that, because spectrum was scarce and interference between users
was a risk, the federal government needed to assign spectrum to deserving
licensees for approved uses. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 FCC Rcd.
1246, 1257 (1948) (“Any regulation of radio, especially in a system of limited
licensees, is in a real sense an abridgment of the inherent freedom of persons
to express themselves by means of radio communications. It is however, a
necessary and constitutional abridgment in order to prevent chaotic
interference from destroying the great potential of this medium for public
enlightment [sic] and entertainment.”). This view was popularized by a 1943
Supreme Court decision. See Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 296 (1943).
59. TUNSTALL, supra note 9, at 252 (“Commentators and ex-staff members
of the FCC have noted that, throughout its history, the commission has always
spent most, perhaps two-thirds, of its time on broadcast issues.”); see also
FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1976).
60. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 746 (1966) (“[T]o insure effective integration of CATV within a
fully developed television service, the new regulation will apply equally to all
CATV systems, including those which require microwave licenses and those
which receive their signals off the air.”).
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The logic of the scarcity argument is largely discredited61
but still has endorsement by the Supreme Court.62 Technology
and markets have largely swept away prior assumptions about
the limits of spectrum assignment. The number of radio
operators is illustrative. There were only about 600 AM radio
operators on the air when the FCC was created, but there were
over 5000 commercial stations in 1965 and more than 10,000 in
1995.63 The FCC’s approval of “hybrid digital” technology in
2002 made an additional 54,000 full-power FM broadcasts
technically feasible.64 In short, every media market in the
United States has dozens or hundreds of radio channels
available.
Broadcast TV has seen similar improvements in channel
expansion. In 1950 there were fewer than 100 commercial
broadcast stations in the United States and only 9.0% of
households had a TV.65 Yet a mere fifteen years later, there
were over 500 stations and 92.6% of homes had a TV.66 Still, in
those early decades of broadcast TV, competition and choice
were rare. Many cities in the 1960s had at best three or four
TV channels.67

61. Many scholars regard Supreme Court endorsement of the scarcity
argument as a “spectacular error.” HUBER, supra note 13, at 41; Jim Chen,
Liberating Red Lion from the Glass Menagerie of Free Speech Jurisprudence, 1
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 296 (2002) (“Of course, no one besides the
Justices actually believes the scarcity rationale.”).
62. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943)
(holding that the Communications Act “puts upon the Commission the burden
of determining the composition of [radio communication] traffic”).
63. See Brent Skorup, Broadcast Radio Remains Tightly Regulated,
MEDIA METRICS (Jan. 2016), http://mediametrics.mercatus.org/broadcastradio-remains-tightly-regulated/.
64. Thomas W. Hazlett & Sarah Oh, Exactitude in Defining Rights: Radio
Spectrum and the Harmful Interference Conundrum, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
227, 248 (2013).
65. TELEVISION BUREAU OF ADVERT., TV BASICS: A REPORT ON THE
GROWTH AND SCOPE OF TELEVISION 2, 18 (2012) (citing TELEVISION & CABLE
FACTBOOK and Nielsen Company data).
66. Id.
67. TUNSTALL, supra note 9, at 121 (1986). At that time, FCC chairman
Newton Minow’s goal to one day increase the number of TV networks from
three to six was considered ambitious. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, at
194.
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Long gone are the days of three networks.68 Even Minow
concluded later that “[t]he FCC objective in the early 1960s to
expand choice has been fulfilled—beyond all expectations.”69
Cable TV, which in the 1960s served mostly to passively
transmit broadcast channels to subscribers, began originating
non-broadcast programming like HBO and ESPN. Slowly, after
fits and starts of cable regulation, the “vast wasteland” of 1960s
TV transformed into hundreds of channels as cable operators
and networks grew.70 This growth in consumer choice has
entered a new stage—the Golden Age of Television71—in the
last few years as satellite, internet, and telephone companies
have ramped up the competition for eyeballs and
programming.72 Internet streaming made even more consumer
choice possible, as more than 100 streaming video-on-demand
services debuted in 2015 and targeted niche audiences.73
This explosion in competition and consumer choice,74
however, poses a threat to the agency’s public utility oversight.
68. It is now a popular complaint that there is “too much” TV and
internet-delivered media and news. Emily Yahr, What We Learned from the
Giant List of 1,400 TV Shows Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/01/29/whatwe-learned-from-the-giant-list-of-1400-tv-shows-last-year/ (“In the last year,
FX network president John Landgraf has been on a mission to convince people
that there’s too much TV.”).
69. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, at 200.
70. Id. at 188.
71. See David Carr, Barely Keeping Up in TV’s New Golden Age, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/media
/fenced-in-by-televisions-excess-of-excellence.html.
72. Since 2002 cable operators have lost over fourteen million subscribers
and significant market share. See Brent Skorup, Deregulation of Television
Finally Bearing Fruit for Consumers, TECH. LIBERATION (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://techliberation.com/2015/10/14/deregulation-of-television-finally-bearing
-fruit-for-consumers/. Compare Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 17 FCC Rcd.
26901 (Dec. 31, 2002) (reporting 68.8 million cable households), with Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video
Programming, 30 FCC Rcd. 3253 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs
_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-41A1.pdf
(reporting
54.4
million
cable
households).
73. Jeff Baumgartner, INTX 2016: SVOD Reaches Its Second Stage,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (May 20, 2016), http://www.multichannel.com/news
/content/intx-2016-svod-reaches-its-second-stage/405088.
74. When asked to assess the state of TV in the early 1990s, before directbroadcast satellite and telephone companies were a competitive threat to
cable, former chairman Minow concluded that things have greatly improved.
See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, at 200 (“If you are a sports fan, a news
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Minow warned, “[a] television system with hundreds or
thousands of channels—especially channels that people pay
to watch—not only destroys the notion of channel scarcity
upon
which
the
public-trustee
theory
rests
but
simultaneously breathes life and logic into the libertarian
model.”75 As with the demise of natural monopoly in
telecommunications, the demise of scarcity in media sent FCC
defenders searching for new theories of regulation.76 As a
rearguard defense against market proponents, Minow helpfully
suggested new social objectives for the FCC, including
affordability, inclusiveness, education of youth, and elimination
of violence.77 Accordingly, the FCC increasingly uses a
foundational prerogative of public utility regulators—
transaction approval—to extract content obligations from
media firms and pursue other social objectives, like donations
to public safety groups from regulated firms.78 Like universal
service responsibilities in telecommunications, these FCCinitiated social aims serve an adaptive purpose as scarcity of
media outlets looks implausible as a basis for public utility
regulation of media distributors.
III. AGENCY SURVIVAL
“What giants do you mean?” said Sancho Panza in amaze. “Those
you see yonder . . . are no giants, but windmills . . .”
“It seems very plain,” said [Don Quixote], “that you are but a
novice in adventures: these I affirm to be giants; and if thou art
afraid, get out of the reach of danger, and put up thy prayers for
me, while I join with them in fierce and unequal combat.”79

junkie, a stock-market follower, a rock-music devotee, a person who speaks
Spanish, a nostalgic old-movie buff, a congressional-hearing observer, a
weather watcher—you now have your own choice.”); see also John Eggerton,
“Wasteland” Revisited, BROAD. & CABLE (Feb. 29, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www
.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/wasteland-revisited/154187.
75. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, at 67.
76. Werbach, supra note 16 (proposing the FCC shift focus to noneconomic issues, regulation of bottlenecks, and “vestigial scarcities”).
77. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, at 200–202.
78. See, e.g., Brent Skorup & Christopher Koopman, FCC Transaction
Reviews and First Amendment Risks, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 675 (2016).
79. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE HISTORY AND ADVENTURES OF
THE RENOWNED DON QUIXOTE 44 (Tobias Smollett trans., Wordsworth eds.
1998).
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Agency obsolescence is a conundrum that scholars have
long pondered.80 Social and economic problems diminish or
disappear, yet the agencies don’t shrink and may actually grow
larger.81 The attainment of their original social aims is not
entirely welcome by officials in the agency because, as Minow
noted, those circumstances give credence to the libertarian
model, and the agency must justify its existence or legacy
programs.82 Jonathan Macey goes further: “[O]nce an agency
has become obsolete, particularly when that fact is beginning to
become noticed by scholars, journalists, and interests whose
objectives would best be served by the demise of the
agency . . . [then] agency personnel all share the same basic
goal: survival.”83 When statutes are obsolete, judges and
agencies can interpret them in ways that occasionally preserve
some usefulness.84 When agencies are obsolete, however, they
frequently behave in ways that inflict high economic costs.85
Economist Thomas Sowell notes the significant opportunity
cost of obsolete agencies: productive bureaucrats with high
human capital divert their efforts to diminishing social or
marketplace evils.86 Controversial, politicized regulatory
enforcement displaces market activity and galvanizes

80. See Kearney, supra note 44 (discussing the obsolescence of the FCC’s
responsibilities); Macey, supra note 21, § II (discussing the obsolescence of the
SEC’s responsibilities).
81. For fiscal year 1993, the FCC budget was $134 million (without
adjusting for inflation) and 1700 employees; for FY 1996 the request was $224
million and 2300 employees. 142 CONG. REC. S2207–08 (daily ed. Mar. 15,
1996) (statement of Sen. Pressler). For fiscal year 2000, the FCC estimated
costs of $230.9 million (without adjusting for inflation) and 1930 full-time
equivalents (FTEs). FCC, FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET ESTIMATES 36 (1999),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc2000budget.pdf. For fiscal year 2017, the
FCC requested $358.3 million and 1650 FTEs. FCC, FISCAL YEAR 2017
BUDGET IN BRIEF 4 (2016), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily
_Business/2016/db0209/DOC-337668A1.pdf.
82. See sources cited supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. Macey, supra note 21, at 917–18.
84. Id. at 913.
85. Id. at 913.
86. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1996). Sowell
further explains: “As those evils are successively reduced, either by the
agency’s own activity or by other technological or social developments, the
agency must then apply more activity per residual unit of evil, just in order to
maintain its current employment and appropriations level.” Id. at 141; see also
Macey, supra note 21, at 914.
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congressional and pressure group defenders, while important
but less controversial proceedings fall by the wayside.87
The resilience of the FCC is particularly confounding.
Congress foresaw a diminishing role for the FCC in
telecommunications88 and media markets89 and a negligible
role in regulation of the internet and internet service
providers.90 It appears the FCC initially accepted those
widespread norms about allowing market competition to
replace regulation.91 In 1999 the FCC published a draft
document called “Strategic Plan: A New FCC for the 21st
Century” that outlined the agency’s new vision.92 The document
predicted that the early years of the new millennium would see
“vigorous competition that will greatly reduce the need for
direct regulation.”93 The agency also noted that the
convergence of communications and media would erode the
traditional regulatory silos.94
This deregulatory posture attracted notice from regulatory
scholars. Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill noted in a

87. For one such example, see John Haring & Evan Kwerel, Competition
Policy in the Post-Equal Access Market 6 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y,
Working Paper, 1987), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers
/oppwp22.pdf (discussing the economic costs of the FCC’s pursuit of inefficient
direct regulation after the 1984 AT&T divestiture).
88. The 1996 Telecommunications Act gave the FCC unprecedented
authority to unilaterally decide to forbear from enforcing its common-carrier
rules and statutes. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996). The common-carrier forbearance provision is codified at
47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
89. The FCC has the authority to repeal some media ownership rules. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56,
111–12 (1996); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199,
§ 629, 118 Stat. 3 (2004).
90. The Act announced a policy that the internet and internet service
providers should be free from regulation entirely. “It is the policy of the United
States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012). “Interactive computer
service” is provided by ISPs. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
91. For instance, in its fiscal year 2000 budget request, the agency stated
it would “deregulate as competition develops.” See FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET
ESTIMATES, supra note 81, at 35.
92. FCC, STRATEGIC PLAN: A NEW FCC FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Aug.
1999),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_Releases/1999
/draft_strategic_plan.pdf.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 3.

2017]

FCC AND QUASI-COMMON CARRIAGE

647

seminal 1998 article that regulated industries like
telecommunications, energy, and transport were undergoing a
transformation.95 They documented a shift away from
traditional entry restrictions and oversight of tariffs, toward an
emerging philosophy where public agencies would regulate only
the “monopoly bottlenecks” and leave the rest to competition.96
With nearly twenty years of hindsight, that theory can be
modified for telecommunications and media regulation. As
media and communications markets grow competitive, FCC
focus has moved away from vanishing monopolies and toward
regulation of “gatekeepers,” a concept that elides the market
power that Kearney and Merrill contemplate. Gatekeeper
appears to mean an exclusive contractual relationship between
an operator and a supplier or an end user97—what the FCC
idiosyncratically called in one recent order a “monopoly on
access to subscribers”—that exists even when several
competing providers are present.98 Having adjudged a provider
a gatekeeper, the FCC even disclaims needing to determine
whether the provider has the ability to raise price.99
Identifying
gatekeepers
in
mass
media
and
communications was only the first step. To stave off
obsolescence, the FCC also needed to tie regulation of
gatekeepers to extant legal precedent. Fortunately for the
agency, coinciding with the rise of competitive communications
and media markets was the breakdown of common carriage.
What remains is a contradictory mess of quasi-common
carriage precedents dating back decades. While it is impossible
to glean a coherent theory of common carriage from these
precedents, their inconsistencies give legal plausibility to the
FCC’s selective enforcement of common-carrier obligations on
gatekeepers. The shift to regulate gatekeepers, unmoored from
findings of market power and the strictures of pure common
95. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 23.
96. Id. at 1405.
97. The “net neutrality” order uses the term “gatekeeper” dozens of times
and reveals the flexibility of the term. See Protecting & Promoting the Open
Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, ¶ 78 (Feb. 26, 2015) (“Broadband providers
function as gatekeepers for both their end user customers who access the
Internet, and for various transit providers, CDNs, and edge providers
attempting to reach the broadband provider’s end-user subscribers.”).
98. Id. ¶ 80.
99. Id. ¶ 84 (“We therefore need not consider whether market
concentration gives broadband providers the ability to raise prices.”).
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carriage, gives the FCC expansive and lasting powers over
broadband internet and the nascent services that ride on data
networks.
A. THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMON CARRIAGE
The Communications Act, as noted, created the FCC and
brought broadcast radio and telecommunications under a single
regulator. Both were viewed as a type of public utility.100 These
two services corresponded to two distinct ways people were
using wireless and wired technologies in the 1930s. Telephone
(and telegraph) was a wired, one-to-one, common-carrier
communications service under one regulatory framework called
Title II.101 In contrast to phone companies, most broadcast
infrastructure owners originated and acquired programming
and exercised significant editorial functions over the messages
transmitted.102 Radio, therefore, was a wireless, broadcast,
private-carrier communications service under a separate
regulatory framework called Title III.103 “Broadcast via wire”
service—that is, one-to-many, via wireline—was thought
infeasible around the time of the FCC’s creation.104 This
omission would fuel the quasi-common-carriage precedents,
since the FCC, decades later, would struggle mightily to
classify technology like cable TV and data services that
resembled neither radio broadcast nor telephony.
Modern common carriage is derived from common-law
precedents regarding public “callings,”105 but identifying a
consistent theory about which providers are common carriers

100. The first general counsel of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
noted that broadcasting was a non-common-carrier public utility. Caldwell,
supra note 27, at n.62; Law Review Editors, supra note 6, at 79.
101. HUBER, supra note 13, at 31.
102. There were some early wireless common carriers when the FRC was
created, such as fixed point-to-point stations. See Caldwell, supra note 27, at
328.
103. HUBER, supra note 13, at 31.
104. Caldwell, supra note 27, at 319 (“Theoretically wires could be made to
perform [one-to-many] services, but economically this is impossible.”).
105. See Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the
Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 169–70 (1904). Courts today primarily
look to how a network functions, not how regulators classify it. See Nat’l Ass’n
of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“A
particular system is a common carrier by virtue of its functions, rather than
because it is declared to be so.”).
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and what obligations they have is difficult.106 In
communications law, common carriage implies many statutory
duties, such as just and reasonable rate requirements (typically
implemented by the filing of tariffs) and nondiscrimination
mandates.107 Perhaps the single hallmark that distinguishes
common carriers from private carriers is that common carriers
abandon control over the content traversing the network.108
Telecommunications providers are common carriers and
therefore function as “dumb pipes” that passively transmit
messages.109 Private carriers like broadcasters curated content
and therefore avoid common-carriage obligations.110
These neat distinctions between common carrier and
private carrier would not last.111 Largely because of
government attempts to control and influence content,
broadcast and media distributors were burdened with some
common-carrier attributes and compelled to abandon some
control of transmitted messages. On the other hand, traditional
common-carriage requirements in telecommunications were
weakened, largely by deregulatory policy, after the 1970s.
Today, therefore, telephone, cable TV, satellite TV,
broadcast, and internet service providers all have attributes of
common carriage and private carriage—that is, they are quasi106. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 67, 109 (2008) (“It is hard to find a specific characteristic that
leads to nondiscriminatory access and rate regulation.”); Kevin Werbach, Only
Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1247 (2007) (“Common law sources
are also unhelpful, offering competing and largely inconsistent rationales.”);
Christopher Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based
World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 552 (2013) (“[A] number of recent scholars have
reviewed the historical justifications of common carriage only to
conclude . . . that they fail to yield a coherent rationale.”).
107. See Noam, supra note 26, at 436; James B. Speta, A Common Carrier
Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 262 (2002).
108. Allen S. Hammond, IV, Network Regulation in the United States, in 13
THE FROEHLICH/KENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 241 (Fritz E.
Froehlich & Allen Kent eds., 1997) (“All who pay a timely subscription
fee . . . may gain access and enjoy usage” of the common commercial carrier
network.).
109. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2012) (defining telecommunications).
110. Cf. HUBER, supra note 13, at 42–43.
111. A mere three years after the formation of the FRC, its former general
counsel stated in a law review article, “I must frankly confess that I do not
know where the exact boundary line should be fixed in determining what
kinds of stations should be placed under the common carrier obligation.
Clearly some ought to be, and just as clearly some cannot be.” Caldwell, supra
note 27, at 329.
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common carriers. A quasi-common carrier may control and
curate some content on its network but is prohibited from
exercising total control over content. Today’s quasi-common
carriers typically don’t need to file tariffs but may need FCC
permission to launch new services or modify existing services.
As formalized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
three major categories the FCC regulates are common-carrier
telecommunications services; free, over-the-air broadcast
services; and subscription cable TV services.112 These stylized
categories have almost completely broken down as networks
converged and competed. As we explain, for decades, common
carriers have offered non-common-carrier services and entities
that are not common carriers, such as cable TV companies and
FM radio broadcasters, have entered the telecommunications
field as technology and consumer behavior changed.
1. Broadcast
Broadcasters’ control of their facilities and content is not
absolute, and for decades the FCC imposed nondiscrimination
burdens on licensees.113 By statute, broadcasters are not
common carriers,114 yet common-carriage elements have crept

112. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal
Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 976, 985 (1997).
113. See Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 825–26 (2008). There is no accepted meaning of the public
interest. Then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Telecommunications and
Information Henry Geller said in 1978 that the standard represented
surrender from Congress: “All the public interest standard says is ‘We give
up.’” Erwin G. Krasnow, Herbert A. Terry & Lawrence D. Longley, Rewriting
the 1934 Communications Act, 1976–1980: A Case Study of the Formulation of
Communications Policy, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 345, 365 (1980). Though they are
members of the press protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
has withheld strong First Amendment protections for FCC regulation of
broadcaster speech. This has long posed a First Amendment paradox—
broadcasters are speakers but have programming obligations as public
trustees. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 252 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (“At present we simply do not know how to ideally resolve the conflict
between diversity and freedom from regulation.”); Anthony E. Varona, Out of
Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American
Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 163 (2006).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012) (“[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”).
In fact, the FCC revoked the license of a broadcaster who sold inexpensive
five-minute blocks of airtime to amateurs, foreign-language programmers, and
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into broadcast licensure. As one scholar noted years ago, “[o]ver
the years, government regulation of broadcast content has been
tailored toward making the broadcaster a hybrid—part
autonomous speaker, part common carrier. The much maligned
‘public trusteeship’ doctrine reflects a view of broadcaster as
common carrier.”115
While the “media access” theories116 that sought to impose
common carriage requirements on media distributors weren’t
prevalent until the 1960s, the FCC and its predecessor, the
Federal Radio Commission (FRC), nourished that movement by
expressly considering program content in the early publicinterest determinations for license renewal. The FRC had, and
the FCC has, no statutory authority to influence the choice of
programming,117 and the FRC’s initial intrusion into
programming, according to the commission’s first general
counsel, happened inadvertently.118 Yet by 1940 the FCC had
made content a critical element of renewal and declared that
religious groups and did not police the content aired. Cosmopolitan Broad.
Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
115. Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of
Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 595 (1984). Another quasi-common-carrier
requirement for broadcasters was the mandate for “equal time” for legally
qualified candidates for political office. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2012). The
Supreme Court upheld this mandate and “statutory right of access” as
comporting with the First Amendment. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
116. The media access school, which crested in the 1960s and 1970s,
advocated that FCC regulation of media was required to promote democracy
and free speech. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment
Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Michael
Botein, Federal Communications Commission’s Fairness Regulations: A First
Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 294 (1969). As one scholar noted at the time, “the owners and managers
of the media have become the real sources of suppression and censorship in
America, with perhaps an even greater capacity to suppress thought than the
government itself.” David L. Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the
Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1973).
117. Louis G. Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting, 177
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 179, 188 (1935); see also 47 U.S.C. § 326
(2012) (prohibiting FCC censorship and protecting broadcasters from freespeech interference).
118. In the immediate wake of the creation of the FRC in 1927, the
airwaves were in chaos because many broadcasters were attempting to secure
their place on the air, yet it took three years for the FRC to adopt even basic
procedural regulations. Caldwell, supra note 117, at 196–97. The FRC,
needing some way to differentiate between similarly qualified applicants in
the interim, began considering programming for licensure. Id. at 197–98.
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broadcasters were public trustees who needed to be “sensitive
to the problems of public concerns in the community and to
make sufficient time available, on a non-discriminatory basis,
for the full discussion thereof.”119 Abandonment of control over
content followed. Broadcaster obligations were augmented with
the 1949 “fairness” requirements, including the “obligation to
make available on demand opportunities for the expression of
opposing views.”120
Other quasi-common-carriage norms accumulated. Like
any utility and telecommunications provider, broadcasters
must apply to the FCC before building a broadcast station or
transferring a license, and the FCC must find that the public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served.121 In the
1970s, stations found that even their decisions to modify
formats, say, from money-losing classical music to rock music,
required FCC permission122—an obligation that resembles the
214 process whereby common carriers apply to the FCC to
discontinue or reduce their services.123
Also, in the 1960s the fairness requirements evolved, at the
insistence of the FCC and the Supreme Court, into a restricted
right of access to broadcast facilities and free airtime.124 As a
result, complaints about fairness and access dominated
commissioners’ time.125 Courts struggled to adjudicate
complaints against broadcasters, who were formally private
carriers but had to comply with these quasi-common carriage
obligations. In a 1971 case concerning a network’s rejection of
an anti–Vietnam War advertisement, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the DC Circuit even granted public-issue groups the
“limited right of access to radio and television” they sought on
119. United Broad. Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, 517 (1945).
120. Report on Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, supra note 7, at 1251.
121. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012).
122. Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 930
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (reprimanding the FCC for “desir[ing] as limiting an
interpretation as possible”); see also Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC,
506 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[W]hen the format to be discontinued is
apparently unique to the area served . . . a hearing on the public interest must
be held.”); Citizens Comm. to Pres. the Present Programming of the Voice of
the Arts in Atlanta on WGKA-FM v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
123. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2012).
124. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding an FCC
determination that a Goldwater critic was entitled to free airtime to respond
to an on-air attack).
125. TUNSTALL, supra note 9, at 252.
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First Amendment grounds.126 The Supreme Court reversed
that holding because such a ruling rendered broadcasters
common carriers,127 yet the Court equivocated and affirmed
that broadcasters, as public trustees, must sacrifice their
editorial discretion and continue to provide a right of access to
their facilities.128 With the tacit backing of the FCC and the
courts, community activists made constant appeals to stations
for airtime, many of which were granted by broadcasters who
feared loss of license.129
During the Carter and Reagan administrations,
proponents of laissez-faire also blurred the lines between
common carriage and private carriage by encouraging Title III
broadcasters to enter markets that were previously the domain
of Title II common carriers.130 Broadcast technology advances
meant more efficient use of wireless frequencies, which left
excess capacity. For decades, the FCC watched uneasily as

126. Bus. Execs.’ Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (italics in original omitted). This decision contains an early noblocking requirement for broadcasters. Id. at 646 (“We hold specifically that a
flat ban on public issue announcements is in violation of the First
Amendment . . . .”).
127. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116 (1973).
128. The FCC “must remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable
‘middle course’ in its quest to preserve a balance between the essential public
accountability and the desired private control of the media.” Id. at 120; see
also Lange, supra note 116, at 40 (“Yet it is abundantly clear that the majority
is unprepared either wholly to accept the ‘risks of abuse’ posed by unlimited
editorial discretion or to abandon the ‘government control’ already imposed
upon broadcast content.”). This equivocation permitted the FCC to create de
facto content mandates. Harry Cole & Patrick Murck, The Myth of the
Localism Mandate: A Historical Survey of How the FCC’s Actions Belie the
Existence of a Governmental Obligation to Provide Local Programming, 15
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 340, 358 (2007) (“The Commission’s goal was to
create a regulatory system which, if complied with, would effectively (but
indirectly) compel broadcasters to do something which the FCC could not
obligate them to do.”).
129. The agency listed detailed rules requiring licensees to ascertain the
programming desires of the community, including polling the views of
powerful local groups. Levi, supra note 113, at 835–36. To retain their license,
broadcasters needed to send detailed logs of programming to the FCC to
demonstrate that their programming was responsive to the programs
requested via survey. See, e.g., Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Reregulation of Radio and TV
Broad., 69 F.C.C.2d 979, 1002–08 (Sept. 22, 1978).
130. See generally Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the
Internet, 584 ANN. INST. ON TELECOMM. POL’Y & REG. 231 (1999).

654

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 18:2

wireless services substituted for wired telecommunications131
and occasionally attempted to prevent Title III services from
encroaching on Title II service.132 Scholars at the time foresaw
the tension created by Communication Act’s artificial point-topoint and broadcast distinction:
As long as radio communications and common carrier transmissions
remained relatively separable industries, administration of these
different standards did not prove difficult. But as the nonbroadcast,
nonentertainment carriers increasingly utilize radio in the
performance of their services, the Commission will be called on more
often to reconcile the diverse approaches of Title II and Title III.133

In the mid-1950s, to bring a semblance of legal consistency,
the FCC allowed only wired common carriers to operate pointto-point microwave radio systems.134 However, this was
permitted only on a developmental basis, and microwave’s
classification was unclear.135 Also around that time, new FM
stations were using their channels to broadcast ad-free,
subscription music services (Muzak and other “background
music” providers marketed these services to retail stores and
commercial venues).136 The FCC tried to create a “nonbroadcast” point-to-point classification for subscription music
that was ancillary to the broadcast service but that decision
was reversed at court.137

131. For instance, in the late 1950s, 22% of long-distance telephone miles
and 78% of TV circuit miles of the Bell System were provided by microwave
radio. Comment, Allocating Radio Frequencies between Common Carriers and
Private Users: The Microwave Problem, 70 YALE L.J. 954, 956–57, n.19 (1961).
132. Radio broadcasters risked their license if their programming
resembled point-to-point messaging. Adelaide Lillian Carrell et al., 7
F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939) (noting that “the use of a broadcast station for point-topoint delivery of messages” to the local police department violates Commission
rules); Bremer Broad. Co., 2 F.C.C. 79, 83 (1936) (noting that transmitting
horserace results to “particular individuals,” rather than the general public,
violates commission rules); Scroggin & Co. Bank, Station KFEQ, 1 F.C.C. 115,
196 (1934–1935) (condemning the transmission of personalized advice to radio
listeners); Applications of Standard Cahill Co., 1 F.C.C. 227, 230 (1935)
(disapproving of sponsored programming for horserace fans on the grounds
that such arrangements are “point-to-point communication rather than
broadcasting”).
133. Allocating Radio Frequencies, supra note 131, at 956.
134. Id. at 957–59.
135. Id.
136. See Peter Blechta, Muzak, Inc. – Originators of “Elevator Music,”
HISTORYLINK.ORG (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.historylink.org/File/10072.
137. Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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With deregulation norms in the 1970s and 1980s, however,
the FCC decided to allow radio and TV broadcasters to use
excess subchannels for ancillary services, including commoncarrier services like paging and telemetry.138 The FCC quietly
omitted classification of these new services,139 leading one
commenter to call one such proceeding “another ‘Title II ½’
action,” midway between common carriage (Title II) and
broadcasting (Title III).140
A prominent breakdown in the common carrier–
broadcast dichotomy came after the 1982 authorization of
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service.141 Satellite carriers
started out as pure common carriers of cable TV
programming
competing
with
AT&T’s
long-distance
transmission service, but satellite operators began deviating
from common carriage by distributing their own TV
programming tiers directly to consumers.142 Scholars and
FCC staff were struggling to decide whether new “multifunctional technologies” like DBS should be classified as a
common carrier or as a broadcaster.143 Rather than force the
issue, the FCC expressly declined to slot DBS into either
Title II or Title III.144 In 1986, so as not to bias new services
like DBS toward any one business model or service, the FCC
declared subscription, encrypted wireless services to be “nonbroadcast
services,”
neither
broadcast
nor
telecommunications.145 Such operators are permitted use
138. Susan Tyler Eastman, Policy Issues Raised by the FCC’s 1983 and
1984 Subcarrier Decisions, 28 J. BROAD. 289, 292, 297 (1984); Howard A.
Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless
“Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1070 (1997).
139. The FCC in the 1950s allowed TV broadcasters to operate microwave
relay facilities for temporary periods until common carrier facilities were
available. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C.2d
359, 412 (1959). The FCC equivocated on whether such point-to-point
microwave transmissions were Title II or Title III. Allocating Radio
Frequencies, supra note 131, at 956.
140. Eastman, supra note 138, at 295.
141. Shelanski, supra note 138, at 1062–63.
142. HUBER, supra note 13, at 64–65.
143. John Lyon & Mike Hammer, Deregulatory Options for a Direct
Broadcast Satellite System, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 185, 187 (1981).
144. Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to DBS for the
Period Following the 1983 Reg’l Admin. Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d 676,
708 (1982) (“[W]e decline at this point to require DBS systems to operate
under a particular service classification . . . .”).
145. See Subscription Video Serv., 51 Fed. Reg. 1817, 1822 (1986).
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their allocations and capacity for common-carrier services
and programming services.146
2. Telecommunications
In telecommunications, likewise, the breakdown often
came from deregulatory actions. In particular, regulators since
the 1970s have encouraged telecommunications providers to
enter non-telecommunications markets like TV distribution
and “information services,” and the mixing of services on the
same facilities made carriage distinctions and Title II
enforcement difficult.147
The
withering
away
of
common
carriage
in
telecommunications, which Professor Eli Noam warned of in
the mid-1990s, may have been inevitable.148 The nineteenthcentury conception of common carriage based on physical
transport such as railroads and ferries never quite fit the
transmission of information via telegraph and telephone. Turnof-the-century judges were not certain how to apply the
common-carrier principles to these new distributors, with some
courts expressly deeming phone operators “quasi-common
carriers.”149
Despite this unsettled history, the FCC attempted to
quarantine common carrier, dumb-pipe services for years with
diminishing success. Telephone companies (telcos) were
constantly looking for new, nontelephone markets to serve.

146. Shelanski, supra note 138, at 1068; see also Inquiry into the Dev. of
Regulatory Policy in Regard to DBS for the Period Following the 1983 Reg’l
Admin. Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), aff’d in part sub nom. Nat’l
Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1199–1206 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
147. See generally CCTA, History of Cable, CALCABLE.ORG, https://www
.calcable.org/learn/history-of-cable/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
148. See Noam, supra note 26.
149. South Carolina v. Citizens’ Tel. Co., 39 S.E. 257 (S.C. 1901) (holding
that telephone systems are quasi–common carriers); Cent. Union Tel. Co. v.
Swoveland, 42 N.E. 1035, 1038 (Ind. App. Ct. 1895) (“While it may be true,
that telegraph and telephone companies do not occupy the exact legal status of
common carriers of passengers and freight, yet they bear a strong analogy to
these.”); S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANIES INCLUDING ELECTRIC LAW 32 (2d ed. 1916) (citing
court decisions for the notion that telegraph and telephone companies “are
not, strictly speaking, common carriers in that they are not insurers”); S.
WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANIES 28 (1906) (“The telegraph and telephone companies are not
common carriers and so insurers of a correct transmission of messages . . . .”).
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Given the incentive of AT&T and its affiliates to leverage their
monopoly power into new services, the Department of Justice,
in a 1956 antitrust settlement, required Bell operators to offer
only common carrier services.150 This decision only briefly
paused telco entry into non-telecommunications.
First, the rise of computerization a few years later
stimulated telcos’ interest in this new field. Starting in the
1960s, the FCC endeavored to maintain the common carrier
quarantine and delineate between “enhanced” services and
“basic” services that use telecommunications lines.151 Signaling
the difficulty that would plague communications policy to the
present, the FCC recognized “hybrid” services that straddled
the line between pure communications and pure data
processing, and the agency decided to classify such services on
a case-by-case basis.152 In the ensuing Computer II and
Computer III proceedings, the FCC allowed common carriers to
offer information services (but on a highly regulated basis).153
And while the Bell companies were at first prohibited from
providing “electronic publishing” and “information services” in
the 1982 breakup,154 even that prohibition was relaxed a few
years later.155
TV distribution also presented a new, non-common carrier
service for telcos. While “broadcast via wire” was impractical in
the 1930s, entrepreneurs in the field of cable and community
antenna TV (CATV) started distributing over-the-air TV
programs in the 1940s and 1950s.156 Telephone operators
recognized TV as a new revenue opportunity, and non-Bell

150. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.
N.J. 1956).
151. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Commc’ns Servs. and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28
F.C.C.2d 291 (1970).
152. Id. ¶ 15.
153. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations,
Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980);
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Third
Computer Inquiry, Report & Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 258 (1986).
154. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 180–86, 189–90 (D. D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
155. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D. D.C. 1991), stay
lifted, 1991 WL 238308 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Am. Newspaper Publishers
Ass’n v. United States, 502 U.S. 932 (1991).
156. See CCTA, History of Cable, supra note 147.
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companies made a few efforts to enter that business.157 The
FCC stood firm at first, prohibiting cable-telephone cross
ownership in 1970,158 and in 1971 it rejected a 214 petition159
from a New York City phone company that wanted to lease its
conduit for cable-TV-like video programming in competition
with cable systems.160 Congress codified this cross-ownership
prohibition in 1984, essentially denying telco entry into TV.161
Yet in 1992, in order to promote TV competition, the FCC again
weakened the firewall between telecommunications and nontelecommunications by permitting “video dial tone” from
common carrier phone companies.162 Video dial tone, which
included interactive and video-on-demand services, was
invented as a way to thread the needle between a Title II
common carrier channel service and a Title VI curated cable
TV service.163
In the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress erased the
formal distinction between common carrier networks and
private-carrier video networks.164 Drawing on the controversial

157. See id.
158. Applications of Tel. Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for
Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.,
Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), recons. in part by 22 F.C.C.2d
746 (1970).
159. Section 214 provides that telephone companies must obtain FCC
approval that new facilities are in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2012).
160. The FCC declined the Section 214 authority, citing duplication and
waste. See Better TV, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 939, 948 (1971), modified on reh’g, 34
F.C.C.2d 142 (1972). The Bell operating companies had been offering channel
service, a common carrier transmission of TV programming often used in lieu
of pole attachment agreements, to CATV and cable companies since 1959. See
Gen. Tel. Co. of California v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United
States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
161. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-104 (1996).
162. Tel. Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report and
Order, Recommendation to Cong., & Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781 (Aug. 14, 1992).
163. Robert L. Pettit & Christopher J. McGuire, Video Dialtone: Reflections
on Changing Perspectives in Telecommunications Regulation, 6 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 343, 344–47 n.14 (1993). Video dial tone profoundly affected the
speaker status of common carriers, and phone companies even began
defending their entry into video on First Amendment grounds. See
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), aff’d, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded per curiam for
consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
164. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
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video dial tone proceedings and a Clinton administration
proposal,165 Congress reversed its 1984 prohibition and
expressly allowed telcos to enter the video and TV market.
Namely, under the law, phone companies could elect to be open
video systems, a novel regulatory classification of video provider
that imposed certain common carrier obligations on the
participating company, such as nondiscrimination amongst
programmers.166
Another deregulatory action that muddied the common
carrier-private carrier dichotomy was the 1996 law that gave
the FCC authority to refrain from applying common carrier
regulations under certain conditions.167 Today, therefore, the
FCC continues the nearly impossible task of designating and
delineating
between
telecommunications
and
nontelecommunications.168 Recent proceedings have involved
distinguishing between functionally similar services, such as
VoIP and switched telephony, which are classified
differently.169 VoIP is not a Title II service but the FCC still
imposed many Title II regulations on a subset of VoIP
providers.170 Most recently, in the 2015 net neutrality Order,
the FCC distinguished between “non-broadband Internet access
service,” which is not a Title II service, and “broadband
Internet access service,” now a Title II service.171 Title II
broadband services offer similar services as non-Title II data

165. See Eli M. Noam & Carolyn Cutler, Freedom of Expression and
the1992 Cable Act: An Introduction, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 11
(1994).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 573 (2012).
167. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
168. See generally Connect Am. Fund, NPRM, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, 4582
(2011).
169. See id.
170. VoIP, is a telephone-like communications service that uses internet
protocol. The FCC declined to declare VoIP a Title II service. These Title II
obligations include customer proprietary network information protection, 911
calling capability, and universal-service contribution. Connect Am. Fund,
supra note 168, at 4582.
171. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, supra note 97, ¶ 35; Brent Skorup,
Why the FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules Could Unravel, PLAIN TEXT (Mar. 1,
2016),
https://readplaintext.com/why-the-fcc-s-net-neutrality-rules-couldunravel-cc26c6b96418.
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services and there is considerable uncertainty about how the
FCC will distinguish between them.172
3. Cable TV
The 1934 Communications Act didn’t contemplate cable
TV, and the service has always straddled common carrier and
private-carrier classification.173 Early cable systems in the
1940s and 1950s, known as CATV, at first were wired, passive
carriers of broadcast TV, similar to “dumb pipe”
telecommunications companies.174 However, cable operators
eventually began inserting advertising, curating content, and
originating shows.175 As cable systems expanded, city officials
began requiring operators to set aside a portion of their
channel capacity for certain groups, typically on a first-comefirst-serve basis, as a condition of receiving a monopoly
franchise. 176 These quasi-common-carriage requirements for
cable providers177 were then required by the FCC in 1972.178
The FCC rules were struck down by the Supreme Court a few
years later because they impermissibly transformed cable into
common carriers179 but were later reinstated by Congress in
1984, acceding to explicit calls for quasi-common carriage
treatment from media access groups.180

172. See, e.g., John Peha, The Network Neutrality Battles That Will Follow
Reclassification, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 11, 23 (2015) (“There is no practical
difference between the case where a provider offers both a [Title II] BIAS and
a separate [non-Title II] non-BIAS data service over the same, shared
capacity, and the case where a provider uses 100% of the capacity to offer a
BIAS and some specialized non-BIAS services happen to run on top.”).
173. See generally CCTA, History of Cable, supra note 147.
174. See U.S. Patent No. 9,521,464 (filed Aug. 12, 2013) (discussing the
history and background of cable systems).
175. HUBER, supra note 13, at 63.
176. Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster:
Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 790 (1972).
177. Lange, supra note 116, at 5 (“The result is to force cable systems to
operate pro tanto as common carriers.”).
178. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190–92 (1972).
179. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708–09 (1979).
180. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2012). A gay-rights group, for instance, testified to
Congress in 1978 that “cable could be held to a quasi-common carrier standard
and the rights of minority group access.” The Communications Act of 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Comm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Com. on H.R. 13015, 95th Cong. 264 (statement of Martha Fourt &
William B. Kelly, Illinois Gay Rights Task Force).
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Then, in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress imposed a strict
common-carriage duty on cable systems—a requirement to
carry all local broadcast programming upon request,181 a
condition the Supreme Court upheld despite First Amendment
challenge.182 Today, cable TV systems and other TV providers
are quasi-common carriers, and they are prohibited from
exercising control over considerable amounts of programming
on their own networks. They are required to carry all broadcast
TV programming in their local market, permit access to public,
educational, and government groups, and lease access to
competing programmers even though cable systems are
nominally private carriers.183 Further, as discussed above,
cable providers have entered the telephone market with
interconnected VoIP and also offer internet services and are
therefore obliged to follow many Title II regulations despite the
uncertain classification these services.184
B. EVOLUTION TO SOCIAL REGULATION AS A DEFENSE AGAINST
OBSOLESCENCE
Some agencies survive but eventually disappear as their
governing statutes become obsolete.185 Literature on the forms
of regulation often begins with the distinction between social
and economic regulation, and, prior to the 1990s, three agencies
are regularly cited as examples of economic regulators: the ICC,
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and the FCC.186 All three
were agencies with a public-interest mandate that regulated
such things as market entry-exit and rates, so the persistence of
the FCC, and not the other two quintessential economic
regulators, is a puzzle that requires explanation.
Public choice literature appears to offer an explanation.
Lilley and Miller187 predicted what Yandle and Young later

181. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2012).
182. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); see also
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC
authority to require cable operators to provide channel capacity for local
origination).
183. Frieden, supra note 25, at 488–89.
184. Connect Am. Fund, supra note 168.
185. See Kane, supra note 12.
186. See William Lilley III & James C. Miller III, The New “Social
Regulation,” 47 PUB. INT. 49, 50 (1977); Yandle & Young, supra note 24, at 59.
187. Lilley & Miller, supra note 186, at 50.
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confirmed:188 economic regulation would go out of style and be
replaced by more social regulation. Social—or function, as
Yandle and Young prefer—regulation agencies grew rapidly
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, whereas the growth of
economic regulators stagnated and, in many cases, fell away.189
The ICC and CAB proved to be obsolete as economic regulators
and eventually went extinct.190 But the FCC avoided that fate,
in our view, because it adapted and evolved into a social
regulator.
Becoming a social regulator can be an effective defense for
an obsolete economic regulator. Social regulators are more
durable and insulated from the factors that killed the ICC and
CAB.191 For instance, social regulators serve a broader
constituency.192 Economic regulators mainly interface with a
specific industry (e.g., shipping), and any benefits to
consumers are diffused so that the consumers themselves are
not a significant constituency of the regulator.193 Social
regulators, as Yandle and Young argue, are “perceived as
having a larger impact on consumers,” and so consumers
“tend to emerge as a viable interest group.”194 Social
regulators also lay claim to more industries since they
regulate broad functions rather than narrow markets.195 In
this respect, the previous relationship between industry and
regulator is significantly augmented by a transition from
economic to social regulator.196 These characteristics of social
regulation lead to an agency with markedly greater
jurisdiction, more opportunities for custom-tailored rules,197
and, therefore, greater claim to the sort of relevance that
rebuts claims of obsolescence.
These phenomena appear in the case of the FCC and help
account for its rapid shift from an economic regulator of
188. Yandle & Young, supra note 24, at 59.
189. Yandle & Young, supra note 24, at 66 (“Function regulation is the
distinguishing feature that separates the growing from the declining
agencies.”).
190. See Kane, supra note 12.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Yandle & Young, supra note 24, at 63.
195. See Kane, supra note 12.
196. See id.
197. Yandle & Young, supra note 24, at 63.
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bottlenecks around 2000 to its more expansive role as
regulator of media gatekeepers after 2010. At the same time
that the CAB and ICC were abolished, “consumer advocacy”
groups (namely the media access movement) focused on
communications policy, and today this movement manifests
itself as “tech populism.”198 The second phenomenon of a pivot
towards social regulation, claiming authority over more
industries, has seen a surge in recent years. The FCC has
long shaped social policy and programming, often as a soft
censor of media,199 and advocates today wish to import many
of the FCC’s earlier social goals—like diversity of voices and
democratic participation—to the internet.
For instance, President Obama’s transition team member
for telecom policy, Professor Kevin Werbach, has encouraged
the FCC to focus on noneconomic, societal concerns as the
prior justifications for FCC authority, like scarcity and
natural monopoly, wither away.200 FCC Chairman Tom
Wheeler in 2016 expressly positioned the FCC as a consumer
protection agency against media and communications
companies and ISPs.201 Communications scholar Tim Wu has
likewise defended the FCC in congressional testimony as the
superior source of regulatory oversight over internet services
(as opposed to antitrust agencies) because “the FCC is equipped
to deal with issues like regionalism, like localism, like
diversity” and “political bias.”202 In the last few years alone, the
FCC’s expansion into social regulation has included rules about

198. See generally ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DANIEL CASTRO & ALAN
MCQUINN, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW TECH POPULISM IS
UNDERMINING INNOVATION (2015).
199. See FRIENDLY, supra note 59.
200. Werbach, supra note 16.
201. C-SPAN host Peter Slen asked Chairman Thomas Wheeler whether
the agency’s mission had changed as the industry changed. Wheeler replied,
“[i]t’s changed multiple times over those decades and I hope it continues to
evolve because the job of the FCC is to be the advocate for consumers in a
vastly-changing environment.” C-SPAN, Communicators with Tom Wheeler,
THE COMMUNICATORS (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.c-span.org/video/?407802-1
/communicators-tom-wheeler.
202. Net Neutrality: Is Antitrust Law More Effective Than Regulation in
Protecting Consumers and Innovation? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 84, 94 (June 20, 2014) (comments of Professor Tim Wu,
Columbia Law School).
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and investigations into Comcast’s TV programming,203 satellite
radio programming,204 internet user privacy,205 ISP
interconnection agreements,206 video apps,207 and online video
providers.208 The FCC also recently launched an initiative to
improve health outcomes and ties the vitality of healthcare
technologies to its statutory authority.209
Certainly the most significant proceeding and pivot to
social regulation was partially applying Title II rules to
internet access providers—the Open Internet or so-called net
neutrality rules.210 Here we see how the flexibility of quasi203. FCC Comcast-NBCU
Conditions, app. A 139–40 (2011),
http://corporate.comcast.com/images/FCC-11-4-Appendix-A-Conditions.pdf
(requiring the merged firm to transmit public access, educational, and
governmental programming to most of its cable TV subscribers and to exercise
no editorial control over those programs).
204. XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd. 14774 (Oct. 19, 2010),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-184A1.pdf (Applications
for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses to Sirius Satellite Radio,
Inc.) (outlining requirements that Sirius-XM lease a portion of their channel
capacity to unaffiliated programmers owned by racial and ethnic minorities
and prohibiting the exercise of editorial control by Sirius-XM over those leased
programs).
205. Sherrese M. Smith et al., FCC Releases Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for New Broadband ISP Privacy Rules, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 4, 2016)
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=18d81770-47c8-4f84-b1a606fc55cfc9df.
206. The FCC further required the common-carrier obligation of
mandated interconnection on wireless internet access, a service the FCC had
classified as a lightly regulated information service. Frieden, supra note 25,
at 485.
207. The FCC tentatively concluded that the Commission has legal
authority to implement its proposed TV programming access rules on makers
of hardware and software, including applications that allow consumers to
access multichannel video programming and other services. Expanding
Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices, 31 FCC Rcd. 1544 (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A1.pdf.
208. Promoting Innovation & Competition in the Provision of Multichannel
Video Programming Distrib. Servs., 29 FCC Rcd. 15995, (Dec. 19, 2014)
(notice).
CONNECT2HEALTHFCC,
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc209. FCC,
initiatives/connect2healthfcc (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
210. FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet,
FCC (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-strongsustainable-rules-protect-open-internet. Broadband internet carries the
services the FCC has traditionally regulated—voice communications, TV, and
radio—as well as relatively new services like the web, the Internet of Things,
and mobile applications. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901
(Mar. 22, 2007).
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common carriage allows an adaptive expansion of FCC power.
Broadband internet has long defied easy categorization,211
since it carries many telecommunications-like and curated TVlike services and is thus susceptible to many quasi-commoncarriage precedents. Quasi-common-carriage regulation of the
powerful, poly-service internet offsets whatever losses the FCC
incurs as broadcasting wanes, traditional TV moves to internet
distribution, and telephony is deregulated.212 There are now
advocates calling for FCC regulation for cloud-computing
platforms and services like Facebook.213
The net neutrality rules in particular suggest that the
predictions from Kearney and Merrill are at best incomplete.
As they offered, “The role of the agency has been transformed
from one of protecting end-users to one of arbitrating
disputes among rival providers and, in particular, overseeing
access to and pricing of ‘bottleneck’ facilities that could be
exploited by incumbent firms to stifle competition.”214 They
emphasize that the transformation in regulated industries is
predominantly a change in focus from protecting consumers to
mediating disputes between firms.215 Yet the FCC’s focus,
resembling earlier broadcasting regulations in the mediaaccess era, is all of the above: on suppliers, distributors,
competitors, and consumers. The net neutrality rulemaking is
suggestive.216 It was the most significant FCC ruling in
decades, yet the agency expressly disclaimed a need to examine

211. Donald W. McClellan, Jr., A Containment Policy for Protecting the
Internet from Regulation: The Bandwidth Imperative 2, PROGRESS & FREEDOM
FOUND. (Aug. 1997), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop4.5containment
.pdf.
212. Fred B. Campbell, Jr., The First Amendment and the Internet: The
Press Clause Protects the Internet Transmission of Mass Media Content from
Common Carriage Regulation, 94 NEB. L. REV. 559, 576 n.121 (2016).
213. Kevin Werbach, Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1778 (2011)
(“The mechanisms will be less drastic than the government-ownership or
common-carrier regulation applied to traditional public utilities, but cloud
platforms should be subject to reasonable policies to promote the public
interest.”).
214. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 23, at 1326.
215. Id. at 1349–58.
216. See Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, supra note 97, ¶¶ 138–43.
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market power in broadband.217 The economic analysis was
rather meager, leading the FCC’s chief economist to call the
Order “an economics-free zone,”218 and the FCC’s economic
analysis received blistering criticism upon legal review.219 This
groundbreaking Order is therefore at odds with the Merrill and
Kearney thesis, which focuses on market power exercised by
bottleneck providers. Market power plays no part in the FCC’s
rules and signals the agency’s abandonment of economic
regulation for social regulation.220
The FCC has succeeded in insulating itself from abolition
in the face of obsolescence by adapting to the changing styles in
regulation. Its shift from being an industry-specific economic
regulator to a social regulator in the style of other agencies like
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Finance
Protection Bureau, and the Food and Drug Administration
helps explain why it persists when its counterparts in other
common carrier industries have faded away.221
IV. REGULATORY METAPHYSICS AND FINAL THOUGHTS
The FCC’s attempts for decades to keep different
distributors in different regulatory silos proved ineffective and
costly.222 Absent more congressional and judicial skepticism
regarding quasi-common carriage and the FCC’s embrace of
social regulation, we foresee a new resonance of early laments

217. Id. ¶ 11 n.12 (“[T]hese rules do not address, and are not designed to
deal with, the acquisition or maintenance of market power or its abuse, real or
potential.”).
218. L. Gordon Crovitz, “Economics-Free” Obamanet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/economics-free-obamanet-1454282427.
219. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063, slip op. at 32 (D.C. Cir. June
15, 2016) (Williams, J., dissenting), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal
/appellate-courts/cadc/15-1063/15-1063-2016-06-14.html. (“The Order asserts
that ‘[the paid prioritization ban] is supported by a well-established body of
economic literature, including Commission staff working papers.’ This claim
is, to put it simply, false. The Commission points to four economics articles,
none of which supports the conclusion that all distinctions in rates, even when
based on differentials in service, will reduce the aggregate welfare afforded by
a set of economic transactions.”) (citations omitted).
220. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 23.
221. See sources cited supra notes 177–204 and accompanying text.
222. As Peter Huber noted, “[i]t is now clear beyond serious dispute that
the Commission’s schemes for maintaining apartheid in [communications
systems] have cost the national economy hundreds of billions of dollars.”
HUBER, supra note 13, at 48.
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about the FCC. “What in most businesses is a constitutional
right to continue in an honorable calling becomes a mere
privilege to be dispensed periodically to those who successfully
sustain the burden of proving conformity with some vague and
variable standard of conduct.”223
Maintaining service quarantine was difficult enough when
different operators offered distinct services on different
networks—telephone was on twisted-pair copper wire
networks, broadcast was on ATSC wireless towers, and cable
TV was on coaxial cable. Now, however, most operators offer
distinct and hybrid services on the same physical
infrastructure. A Verizon Wireless customer, for instance,
could be receiving a Title I home-security service, a Title II
phone service, and a Title VI TV service all via the same Title
III wireless connection. It is not clear which classification
services like non-broadband internet access and IPTV
receive.224
Ironically, the rise of inter- and intramodal competition in
phone, video, and data services—which laissez faire proponents
cite as a reason for deregulation—fuels the FCC’s survival
strategy.
With
many
more
bargainers
negotiating
interconnection and programming, there are many more
opportunities to identify “gatekeepers” and regulate their
conduct.225 No modern distributor appears immune from a
gatekeeper designation and the resulting quasi-commoncarriage obligations.226 Even a local wireless internet service
provider serving a handful of rural customers is a “gatekeeper”

223. Caldwell, supra note 117, at 206.
224. VERIZON, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PHONE PLANS (2017),
http://www.verizon.com/home/phone/; VERIZON, FIOS TV PLANS AND
CHANNELS (2017), https://www.verizon.com/home/fiostv/; VERIZON, HOME
SECURITY
SYSTEM
AND
FIOS
DIGITAL
VOICE
(2017),
https://www.verizon.com/support/residential/phone/homephone/general+suppo
rt/fios+phone/questions+and+answers/127817.htm.
225. See generally Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to
Competition: Toward a New Model for US Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE
J. ON REG. 55, 75–76 (2007).
226. HUBER, supra note 13, at 158–59; Frieden, supra note 25, at 492
(“[T]he FCC has fashioned new quasi-common carrier obligations for ventures
whose managers probably thought they were free of such government
oversight.”).
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subject to Open Internet rules,227 and the FCC requires
absolutely no finding of market power to subject distributors to
quasi-common carriage.228 The resulting ad hoc rules, extensive
rulemakings, litigation, and regulatory arbitrage give the FCC
ample reason to justify its continued oversight of these rapidly
changing media and communications industries.
Communications scholars Jeff Eisenach and Randy May
compare FCC-made distinctions about what type of service is
being provided to metaphysics because the questions the
agency considers are unanswerable.229 It’s foreseeable that the
embrace of quasi-common carriage for the internet and modern
media, like the attempts to elucidate the difference between
“basic” and “enhanced” services decades ago, will degenerate
into regulatory instability and incoherence.230
Finally, the analysis presented, consistent with that of
earlier public-choice theorists, shows that there is a
fundamental policy asymmetry: agencies have the ability and
incentive to avoid or postpone obsolescence, but there are no
obvious mechanisms to ensure that an obsolete agency winds
down.231 The survivability of obsolete agencies is augmented by
the information asymmetry that exists between an agency and
its legislative overseers.232 Agencies will tend to know more
about the state of their sector than Congress, and they will
therefore be able to act in response to oncoming obsolescence
before it is noticed by legislators who may be interested in

227. Ray Nolting, Proposed Regulations Concern Business, FCC
Commissioner, PARSONS SUN (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.parsonssun.com
/news/article_5d0c40a6-b99c-11e4-ac41-87b0f16bb661.html.
228. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of
Network Neutrality, 45 IND. L. REV. 767 (2012).
229. JEFFREY A. EISENACH & RANDOLPH J. MAY, COMMUNICATIONS
DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM: FINISHING THE JOB 6 (2001).
230. Noam, supra note 26, at 436 (“[E]ventually the separation of two
principles within the same carrier, the same facilities and the same bitstream
cannot work. . . . How is one to maintain the definitional separation?”); Noam
& Cutler, supra note 165, at 11 (“[C]ommon carriage will erode in time and . . .
hybrid coexistence will not be stable.”); Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and
Telecommunications Services, Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges,
and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 232
(1999); Werbach, supra note 213, at 1778 (arguing that with regard to the
regulatory classification of internet access, “any choice the FCC makes will
only be a temporary solution”).
231. See Kane, supra note 12.
232. See id.
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curbing the agency’s influence.233 And the case for expanding
an agency (as is likely to be the response of an agency which
finds its current turf slipping away) is fairly easy to make.234
One need only petition legislators using the rhetoric of the
original justification for the agency and then argue that
expansion of the agency’s budget, scope, or authority
contributes to that goal.235 But these benefits come at a
diminishing rate and are often outweighed by the costs they
impose on others (the marginal benefit of moving from 90%
phone penetration to 95% is smaller and more costly than at
lower levels), but the kernel of truth can make the case
politically palatable to legislators.236
This case study suggests that even when an agency’s goals
have been achieved and Congress has passed deregulatory
legislation, the agency has ample tools (including help from
later champions in Congress, industry, and advocacy) to ensure
survival and even growth. For instance, the FCC bases many of
its rulemakings on reports of competition and service quality
that the agency itself conducts. This practice creates a conflict
of interest such that the FCC can always say that it has more
regulating to do simply by altering its definition of what
constitutes a “gatekeeper” or “the public interest.”237
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. The case is easy because, in a way, it is true. As Mises observed,
“every service can be improved by increasing expenditures.” LUDWIG VON
MISES, BUREAUCRACY (1944).
236. See, e.g., Sam Gustin, Community Broadband Networks, Advocates
Say, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 11, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us
/article/fcc-municipal-broadband-congress-review.
237. For instance, the FCC’s definition of “broadband” changes depending
on whether low-capacity or high-capacity lines would give it more regulatory
authority. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely
Fashion & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband
Data Improvement Act, 30 FCC Rcd. 1567 (Feb. 24, 2015). Depending on the
issue, broadband means 25 megabits per second or greater, 10 megabits per
second or greater, or 56 kilobits per second or greater. See id.; Broadband
Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry on Immediate Action to Accelerate
Deployment, 30 FCC Rcd. 1375, ¶ 3 (2015) (finding that broadband, “advanced
telecommunications capability,” requires download speeds of at least 25
Mbps); Connect Am. Fund, 29 FCC Rcd. 15644 (Dec. 18, 2014) (finding that
broadband, “advanced telecommunications and information services,” requires
a minimum download speed of 10 Mbps); Protecting & Promoting the Open
Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, supra
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For advocates of limited government and robust First
Amendment protections, the analysis we’ve presented suggests
some undesirable predictions. As Professor Rob Frieden
notes,238 “Government tinkering with the common carrier
model has made it all but impossible to apply core principles.”
Justice Clarence Thomas, commenting on the application of
quasi-common carriage to cable providers, noted that First
Amendment jurisprudence for mass media is a “doctrinal
wasteland.”239 It’s an area we expect to become even more
muddled. Quasi–common carriage will lead to a substantial
increase
in
regulatory
restrictions
for
media,
telecommunications, and data services, continuing the trend
since the ostensibly deregulatory Telecommunications Act.240
Formulating restrictions means interminable regulatory
proceedings. Quasi–common carriers like ISPs and cable TV
operators will perpetually argue that they provide “reasonable”
access to unaffiliated firms, and the FCC, media-access groups,
and competitors will argue the opposite.241 Merely defining a
service can take years, and separating services when carried on
the same infrastructure in these fast-changing technology
markets will prove infeasible. The laborious findings about
whether, say, a broadband provider or cable provider is “acting

note 97, ¶ 187 (defining broadband internet access service as any non-dialup
access service).
238. Rob Frieden, Schizophrenia Among Carriers: How Common and
Private Carriers Trade Places, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 19, 37
(1997).
239. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 813
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
240. Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical
Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All United States Industries and
Federal Regulations, 1997–2012, REG. & GOV. (Jan. 2015), http://data
.regdata.org/?type=regulation_index&industry[]=515&industry[]=517&
industry[]=518&regulator[]=299# (showing increases in restrictions from 1997
to 2012 ranging from 17% to 32%). Whether this increase in regulation leads
to agency employment growth is less clear. However, because conclusions
about unreasonable discrimination, a quasi-common carriage standard, in
media are labor intensive, there may be employment growth.
241. The investigations into “zero rating” of IP-based content are
illustrative. Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge Files Comcast Stream TV
Complaint with FCC to Protect Video Competition, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 2,
2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/public-knowledge-filescomcast-stream-tv-complaint-with-fcc-to-protect-vide.
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unreasonably” resemble the laborious findings242 from the
1970s FCC examiner proceedings about whether broadcasters
made “reasonable opportunity” to competing voices.243 Further,
these decisions by the FCC will carry very little precedential
value because, unlike Title II unreasonableness determinations
during the AT&T monopoly, modern broadband and media
markets are competitive, and vertical agreements are in
constant flux. This means that very similar fact patterns
demand litigation and extensive agency examination.244
If quasi-common carriage is accepted as the new norm,
the analysis presented above about the end of economic
regulation in communications and media poses little threat to
the FCC’s expanded jurisdiction. As lawmakers take interest
in the troubling implications of quasi-common carriage, we
echo the findings of current OIRA Administrator Howard
Shelanski: “The lessons from the railroad, natural gas,
banking, airlines, and wireless deregulation are to deregulate
quickly and substantially when . . . competitive forces
arise.”245 The status quo—slow, piecemeal deregulation in the
face of competition in an industry—appears socially costly and
ineffective.246

242. The FCC’s expanded oversight of broadcast-facility access complaints
illustrates how policing quasi–common carriers can give the agency massive
new caseloads to adjudicate. In 1966 the FCC received 409 fairness
complaints, but by 1970 it received over 60,000. Jaffe, supra note 176, at 779
(1972).
243. This resemblance suggests a pernicious effect on the First
Amendment protections of ISPs. Quasi-common carriers need to remain in the
FCC’s good graces to operate, and the FCC is fond of using its substantial
leverage in proceedings to attain ostensibly public-interest benefits. For
decades, broadcast license renewals presented the FCC with the opportunity
to shape the dominant media of the day. As former chairman Newton Minow
said in a speech to broadcasters, “Clearly, at the heart of the FCC’s authority
lies its power to license, to renew or fail to renew, or to revoke a license. As
you know, when your license comes up for renewal, your performance is
compared with your promises.” MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 20, app. 2 at 192;
see also Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 87
(2015) (“Internet platforms face structural incentives to knuckle under
government jawboning over content.”).
244. See generally Section II.A supra (explaining the AT&T monopoly).
245. Shelanski, supra note 53, at 99.
246. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The FCC’s longstanding justifications for economic
regulation of broadcast and telecommunications—spectrum
scarcity
and
natural
monopoly,
respectively—have
disappeared. The agency nevertheless soldiered on and pivoted
toward more social regulation such as universal service in
telephony and fairness in broadcasting. The move toward social
regulation has accelerated in recent years, notably with
promulgating the Open Internet rules and other proceedings
for broadband distributors, as the agency seeks to justify its
survival in a world of media choices, internet connectivity, and
telecommunications competition. Aiding its expansion into
questions of social policy is the breakdown of the distinction
between common carriage and private carriage, which was
fueled by demands for regulation and for deregulation. We
predict and lament that delimiting and enforcing the shifting
quasi-common-carriage obligations on distributors will lead to
an incoherent body of communications and First Amendment
law that will only entrench the FCC as its proceedings grow
more inscrutable to outsiders.

